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AT THIS moment when the labor law of tomorrow is in sus-
pense, it'would be well if we saw clearly the confused labor law
of the generation that is ending. One great mind both watched
and worked at that law the whole while that it was happening.
We believe no clearer picture of it can be had than one in which
Hohnies' views of what it should be, and legal consonances with
them, are central, and inconsistent views and legal ways are shown
with reference to them.' What is here attempted is a sketch for
such a picture, without pretension to completeness. Believing that
there is light in their assemblage, we shall not scruple to re-quote
familiar sayings and re-state familiar cases.
I
IN is approach to labor questions Holmes was free from all
such sentimentality as is expressed in talk of "human rights" or
"brotherhood of man." There was no humanitarian softness in
his head.
His first publication relating to a labor case was in 1873.2 In
England several gas stokers had been punished criminally for
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'Suggestion of this came through examination of LANDis, CASES oN L~roR Low(1934), an excellently frugal and discriminating and richly annotated colection on
which we have leaned heavily. Conjunction with the cases in the chapter called
"General Theories" (most of which are used in Part 11 of this article) of a few
others, especially those in which Holmes dissented in lassachusetts, would make it
illustrate the chief judicial differences in policy and technique. A da.uIfication of
those differences might be made explicit, and superimposed upon or coordinated with
classification of cases as of picketing, boycotts, etc. If this were done, dearnees
and coherence in law school courses on the labor law of the pcassng generation might
be easier to attain than hitherto, and even fewer cases than in Commiss oner Landis
collection might need to be read in full.
2Holmes, The Gas-Stokers' Strike (1873) 7 Am. L. lxv. 583, reprinted, (1931)
44 HDRv. L. REv. 795.
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striking to support the grievances of fellow workmen. The strike
had kept a good part of London in darkness for several nights.
The charge on which the strikers were found guilty was that they
had conspired to interfere with their employers' business by the
unlawful means of breaking their contracts of employment.' Pro-
tests against the theory that this was unlawful 4 resulted two years
after Holmes had written in the statutory enactment that "An
agreement or combination by two or more persons to do . . . any
act in . . . furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and
workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if such act com-
mitted by one person would not be punishable as a crime."'
Only one sentence of Holmes' two page comment dealt with
the case specifically. He approached it through discussion of
"cclass legislation" and Herbert Spencer's harping on the view that
the soundness of legislation depends upon its expediency "for so-
ciety, considered as a whole;" saying:.
"This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of
society is very common, but seems to us to be false. The struggle
for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men
at variance with those of the lower animals. And the struggle does
not stop in the ascending scale with monkeys, but is equally the
law of human existence. Outside of legislation this is undeniable.
It is mitigated by sympathy, prudence, and all the social and
moral qualities. But in the last resort a man rightly prefers his
own interest to that of his neighbors. And this is as true in legis-
lation as in any other form of corporate action. All that can be
expected from modern improvements is that legislation should
easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accord-
ance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the com-
munity, and that the spread of an educated sympathy should
reduce the sacrifice of minorities to a minimum .... The more
powerful interests must be more or less reflected in legislation;
which, like every other device of man or beast, must tend in the
long run to aid the survival of the fittest. The objection to class
legislation is not that it favors a class, but either that it fails to
benefit the legislators, or that it is dangerous to them because a
competing class has gained in power, or that it transcends the
limits of self-preference which are imposed by sympathy ... The
3 Regina v: Bunn, 12 Cox C. C. 316 (1872). The contractual provision, or em-
ployment usage, violated was that of not quitting without notice.4 WFBB, HIsToRy oF TRADE Uxomsm (2d ed. 1920) 284-5.
GCONSPIRACY AND PROTEION OF PROPERTY ACr (1875) 38 & 39 VicT. c. 86, § 3.
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law brought to bear upon the gas-stokers is perhaps open to the
second [objection], that it requires to be backed by a more un-
questioned power than is now possessed by the favored class."
Holmes might later, to avoid the probably unintended impli-
cation that nature determines rightness, have substituted sensibly
for rightly in the fifth of the sentences quoted. And he would
almost certainly have added "educated sympathy" to prudence
as an objection to "the law brought to bear upon the gas-stokers."
But his basic beliefs remained, we believe, unchanged. Rights are
as power makes them, however obnoxiously to whomsoever's
sense of right.
II
HoLi.s' participation in labor law began simultaneously
with the sowing, by the labor injunction, of the seeds of its pro-
fusion. The first labor injunction sustained by an important ap-
pellate court was sustained by the court of which he had lately
become a member.' In that case he said nothing. Perhaps he did
not begin to consider the social tendencies of the innovation until
In re Debs7 raised "storms of protest" in which "many thoughtful
lawyers joined."8 The next year, at the end of his dissenting opin-
ion in Vegelahn v. Guztner,9 he said emphatically: "The general
question of the propriety of dealing with this kind of case by in-
junction I say nothing about." The reason, it seems, was that
the defendants had not raised the question. Perhaps it was al-
ready useless for them to raise it, or for him to try to stem the
injunction tide, if he had wished to.
The institution of the labor injunction must here be passed
without more than mention that feelings about it were important
in the scene in which Holmes' judicial activity commenced. So
were feelings about "the trusts" and the Sherman Act, also here
passed over. Of some other of the earlier conditions in and upon
which Holmes acted, less summary reminder may be needed.
An important change was under way in the suppositions
pretty generally taken for granted by lawyers, as still by laymen,
6 Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 1888).
71n re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).8 Brandeis, J., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 366, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 142 (1921).
9167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
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relating to legal liability. The nature of legal right and wrong
had long seemed clear and settled, and inconsistencies of prac-
tice, even when noticed, were not suffered to disturb assumptions.
It seemed sensible to say that all men, being equally free, had
equal rights--or vice versa. Each had a right to do as he willed
so long as he infringed not the equal rights of another. These
equal rights were somewhat distinguished as of overlapping class-
es, such as personal liberty, property, contract, calling. Though
no one pretended to draw precise lines between them, they were
conceived as absolute and definite. In theory, legal wrong was
"violation of some definite legal right."" In practice, however, the
definiteness of legal rights depended upon that of legal wrongs.
Legal wrongs had long been very definite. It had been rare to
meet one which did not plainly fall into some well-marked cate-
gory-trespass, for instance, or deceit, or breach of contract. So
what could be more natural than assumption that all doing was
in the lawful exercise of legal rights unless it bore the usual ear-
marks of some definite nominate category of legal wrong?
This assumption was usual. Cases were decided upon it-
though if such a case seemed hard, the court might soften it with
intimations of the long-run salutariness of legal hirdships. This
case was decided in 1867.11 At Boston the business of providing
ships with crews was in the hands of keepers of boarding houses
for sailors. The defendants were a number of these "shipping
masters" who had agreed upon a scale of rates of sailors' wages,
and combined not to ship their boarders at lower rates. The
plaintiff was a rate-cutting competitor of the defendants. The
defendants had advertised a purpose to "lay him on the shelf";
and carried it out by withholding or even withdrawing their own
boarders from vessels which shipped men through the plaintiff,
disabling his customers from completing crews. The plaintiff got
no legal remedy. To show why, it sufficed to point out that none
of the defendants' acts belonged in any recognized category of
legal wrong. The court softened the blow by adding that if the
plaintiff's business was destroyed, "it is such a result as in the com-
petition of business often follows from a course of proceeding that
'°See e.g., Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 559 (1871).1 1 Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499 (Mass. 1867).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline  -- 13 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev.  520 1935-1936
HOLMES AND LABOR LAW
the law permits ... It would be nothing novel if the plaintiff in
the exercise of his ingenuity should in his turn adopt some improve-
ment that shall compel the defendants to dissolve their connec-
tion." At least he had the equal right to hurt them equally by
equally lawful means if he could find them. The feeling was that
unless loss incident to such a clash of equal rights were let lie
as it fell, and written off as damnum sine injuria, general enjoy-
ment of the blessings of equal liberty would be in jeopardy.
Of course legal usage was not in all respects consistent with
the assumption that legal rights extended to whatever was not
plainly in some pre-established category of legal wrong. Had it
been there could have been no legal innovation. And not even
private law was ever completely static. Most innovations could
be assimilated without disturbing the assumption. After it was
decided that mere posting of a letter of acceptance completes a
contract, a non-payment of money which would earlier have been
of right could be a wrong.'2 So, after the new category of unfair
competition was established, could a sale of goods with labels re-
sembling a competitor's.' 3 Satisfaction with these innovations
quickly became general. Moreover, the earmarks of legal wrong,
though changed, were as definite afterwards as before. An inno-
vation of this character left assumption that everything was right
which had not yet been classed as wrong as unshaken as if nothing
inconsistent had occurred.
-Some trickles of irreconcilably inconsistent usage were, how-
ever, gaining consequence during the nineteenth century, to merge
towards its end, in labor cases, in a troubling stream. They con-
sisted of cases in which normally lawful conduct was held unlaw-
ful without establishing new definite categories or earmarks of
legal wrong.
In most cases of the species here considered, a number of de-
fendants had been acting together in combination to someone's
damage. Though conspiracy was an old category of legal wrong,
it was not a dear-cut category. It had wide vague edges. In the
eighteenth century such broad statements as these had been cur-
rent:
12Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Grant, 4 Exch. Div. 216 (1879).
U3 See e.g., arsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322 (Mass. 1851).
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"A Conspiracy of any kind is illegal, although the matter
about which they conspired might have been lawful for them, or
any of them to do, -if they had not conspired to do it... There can
be no doubt, but that all Confederacies whatsoever, wrongfully to
prejudice a third Person, are highly criminal at Common Law, as
where divers Persons confederate together by indirect Means to
impoverish a third Person."' 4
In the nineteenth century judges usually agreed, in the ab-
stract, that a combination was not an unlawful conspiracy unless
either its object or some intended means towards it was unlawful.
But this did not prevent increase in the number of cases in which
persons were held to have conspired unlawfully, even though they
neither did nor contemplated anything which was not ordinarily
lawful for an individual. In a good many of these cases unlawful-
ness was said to be imparted to otherwise lawful conduct by the
defendants' malice.",
The trickle of malice cases seems to have commenced, inde-
pendently of conspiracy, in a case decided in 1706.10 The plain-
tiff had a pond on which he trapped wild ducks for the market.
The defendant frighted away ducks not yet trapped "with the
noise and stink of gunpowder." Lord Holt said that an action
lay in this and in all cases "where a violent or malicious act is
done to a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a liveli-
hood." In this case it did not appear that the defendant had any
other object than "to damnify the plaintiff." In but few malice
cases since has there been such "disinterested malevolence.117
And even when a defendant's malevolence seemed as utter, some
courts, not finding his act (fencing his land, for instance) in any
"settled category of legal wrong, said that his malice "cannot make
that wrong which in its own essence is lawful."'8 In other cases
"malice in law" was distinguished from "malice in fact." "Malice
141 HAWvINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716) c. 72, § 2, at 190, In the later
18th century a "conspiracy to impoverish" was a strike to make an employer increase
wages. Rex v. Eccies, Leach C. C. 274 (1783); see WRonxT, LAW oF CIMINAL
CoNsPIRcAis (Am. ed. 1887) 48-51.
15See cases cited in Ames, How Far an Act May be a Tort Because of the
Wrongful Motive of the Actor (1905) 18 HARv. L. REv. 411.10 Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574n (1706).
17Holmes' description of the sort of motive which may well make an injurious
act a tort, in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 203, 206, 25 Sup Ct. 3, 5 (1904);
Am. Bank & Co. v. Fed. Res. Bank, 256 U. S. 350, 358, 41 Sup. Ct. 499, 500 (1921).
1Sjenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308 (1855).
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in law" was considered a necessary ingredient of a good many old-
established definite legal wrongs. It was present, however, if the
defendant intentionally did whatever might be the particular sort
of harmful act. Publication of a libel, for instance, was "malicious
in law" regardless of desire that harm should follow.Y0 It was
often said that, except in criminal law, "malice in fact" was le-
gally material only to support punitive damages and to rebut quali-
fied privilege in defamation.
The view that actual malice could taint normally lawful acts
with illegality continued to gain ground notwithstanding. But in
the cases in which malice was said to be the reason that labor
pressures were unlawful, the motives of defendants, striking for
instance to compel discharge of non-union workmen, could never,
by an undistorted vision, be seen as disinterestedly malevolent.
Judges who felt this sometimes presented their conclusions of
malice as determined by the malevolence of the defendants' "pri-
mary" object. Or they might say, in words or substance, that the
test was "whether they intended rather to harm others than to
benefit themselves."20  Other judges still wrote as if they thought
defendants disinterestedly malevolent.
These and other judicial attitudes towards malice were rep-
resented in the opinions of the Law Lords in Allen v. Flood" and
Quilnz v. Leathem .' In Allen v. Flood the plaintiffs were two
shipwrights who had been employed to repair woodwork on a ship
whose ironwork was being repaired by forty boilermakers. They
were discharged when the defendant, an officer of the boilermakers'
union, told their employer that if he kept them the boilermakers
would strike-their grievance being that the plaintiffs had there-
tofore done ironwork on another ship for another employer. A
jury having found that the defendant had maliciously induced
the plaintiff's employer to discharge them, judgment was entered
for them for £20 apiece.
Lord Halsbury (with whom two other Lords concurred)
thought the defendant's conduct actionable if malicious, and the
19 Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247 (1825).20E.g., State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 236, 58 AfU. 772 (1904); National
Broth. Assn. of Steam Fitters, etc. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 322, 326, 328, 63
N. E. 369-373 (1902).
21[18981 A. C. 1.
22[19011 A. C. 495.
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jury warranted in finding it malicious. The question, as he saw
it, was whether the defendant intended rather to benefit the em-
ployer by warning him of his danger of being inconvenienced if
he kept the plaintiffs at work beside the irate boilermakers, or,
as the jury might well find, to punish the plaintiffs for having
worked on iron. His opinion implies either that the defendant's
union brethren had no pecuniary interest in keeping shipwrights
from working on iron, or that intention to further such an inter-
est was irrelevant to the question of the defendant's malice.23 The
majority, six Lords, were for reversal, substantially agreeing that
the law "does not take into account motive as an element of civil
wrong."' 24 If it should, legal innocence or culpability would de-
pend "upon the fluctuating opinions of the tribunal before whom
the case may chance to come as to what a right-minded man ought
or ought not to do in pursuing his own interests. 2  One, Lord
Shand, was positive, moreover, that tIe defendant was not mali-
cious, being "bent, and bent exclusively, on the object of furthering
the interests of those he represented." 20
For a moment it seemed that this case had ejected from the
law of England the doctrine that malice can matter in it. But
three years later malice was reinstated by a unanimous decision
of the same court, six Lords sitting, of whom two had been of the
majority in Allen v. Flood. The case of Quinn v. LeatheM2n came
up from Ireland. The plaintiff was an employing butcher, and the
defendants members of a newly formed union of "butchers' assist-
ants." Plaintiff's assistants had been unwilling to join the union
'at its inception. When trouble seemed brewing, plaintiff attended
a union meeting and asked to have his men admitted, offering to
pay all fines and demands against them. The sense of the meeting
23t1898] A. C. 1,- 84-5.
24 Lord Watson, id. at 92.
25Lord Herschell, id. at 119; cf. Lord Macnaghten, id. at 153: "... permitting
inquiries into motives when the immediate act ... is in itself innocent or neutral
: . would, I think be intolerable, to say nothing of the probability of injustice ...
in a class of cases in which there would be ample room for speculation and wide
scope for prejudice."2 61d. at 163. In view of Lord Shand's position three years later, it seems
worth noting that he added: "I agree with those of your Lordships who hold that,
even if such a motive had existed in the mind of the defendant, [i.e., malice In
the sense of personal ill-will] this would not have created liability in damages."
Id. at 167.
27[1901] A. C. 495. For a full statement of facts it is necessary to turn to
Lord Brampton's judgment, id. at 516-518.
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seemed to be that some, at least, of plaintiff's men "should walk
the streets for twelve months," and that he put union men in
their places. After plaintiff's refusal, defendants induced three of
plaintiff's men to quit. One of them did so without notice in the
middle of a week, contrary to the contract or usage under which
he was employed. Defendants also "blacklisted" three of plain-
tiff's minor retail butcher customers, one of whom ceased dealing;
and notified one Munce, to whom, without contract, unless usage
made one, plaintiff delivered about 30 pounds of meat each week,
that Munce's men would strike if another consignment of plaintiff's
meat entered his shop. Munce reluctantly telegraphed plaintiff to
stop deliveries unless he could make his peace.
The Lords affirmed plaintiff's judgment for £200 damages (for
loss on meat already killed and dressed for Munce, and general loss
of custom). They were unanimous in opinion that they were de-
ciding Quinn v. Leathem consistently with Allen v. Flood. But
their theories of their consistency, and of the true grounds of the
butchers' assistants' liability, somewhat differed.
Only one Lord utterly eschewed malice, resting chiefly on
inducement of breaches of contracts with knowledge of themYs
Two rested primarily on the defendants' malice, one, Lord Shand,
saying that they acted, "not for any purpose of advancing their
own interests, but for the sole purpose of injuring plaintiff in his
trade." 9 Both distinguished Allen v. Flood as decided in the view
that the defendant there was not malicious. Two others put fore-
most the view that the plaintiff had a positive right to conduct his
business as he pleased, and that, in invading it, the defendants
(unlike the defendant in Allen v. Flood) were not in the exercise
of a similar positive right." Of these five, one referred to con-
spiracy, as an element not present in Allen v. Flood; the others
said more definitely that "a conspiracy to injure--an oppressive
28Lord Aacnaghten, id. at 508-510. The others regarded the procurement of
breaches of contract as immaterial in this case.
29Lord flalsbury, id. at 506-7; Lord Shand, id. at 512-515.
3 OLord Brampton, id. at 524-6, distinguished Allen v. Flood on the ground that
the defendant there was exercising "an absolutely legal right." Here, however,
plaintiff was in the exercise of his right, "as a trader in a free country," to regulate
his own affairs; but he could not see any right, certainly not that of competition,
which the defendants could claim to be exercising. Lord Lindley: "The defendants
were doing a great deal more than exercising their own rights; they were dictating
to the plaintiff and his customers and servants what they should do." Id. at 536;
cf. id. at 533-5.
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combination," gives rise to civil liability if it results in damage."
Though one defined conspiracy with eighteenth century compre-
hensiveness, 32 the others somewhat suggested, without succinctly
saying, that the only reason combination made a legal difference
was that a single person would have been impotent to do the dam-
age. As to why the doing of the damage was unlawful, their vary-
ing reasons were as already stated: interference with contracts,
malice, invasion of positive right. The two whose main point
was plaintiff's positive right described the defendants as malicious
without asserting that their liability did, or that any could, depend
on malice 3 One Lord took no part in the discussion, contenting
himself, perhaps not unmaliciously, with voting for affirmance on
the judgment below of the Irish Court of Appeal. 4
These English cases dramatize an intellectual muddle and con-
trariety of judicial leanings that had also characterized American
labor law for many years before them. Holmes, in his first opin-
ion in a case arising from conflict between workmen and employ-
ers, showed a way for judges to be lucid in dealing with such cases.
If they should follow it, with dispassionate candor, though they
might not become harmonious, they would at least uncloud their
differences.
He proposed nothing unprecedented. As early as 1842 Shaw
had openly invoked "considerations of policy and general con-
3 1Lord Halsbury, id. at 507; Lord Macnaghten, id. at 510-11; Lord Shand, id.
at 512-15; Lord Brampton, id. at 528-531; Lord Lindley, id. at 537-540.
32 "A conspiracy consists of an unlawful combination of two or more persons
to do that which is contrary to law, or to do that which is wrongful and harmful
towards another person." Lord Brampton, id. at 528.3 3 Lord Brampton, id. at 524-6; Lord Lindley, id. at 536. Though the former,
id. at 530-1, stressed the defendants' malevolence, he was sedulous to predicate lin.
biity upon plaintiff's right and defendants' no-right and not on malice.
3 4Lord Robertson, id. at 532.
The TRADE DisPUTEs AcT, 6 EDW. VII, c. 47 (1906), prevents much application
in English labor cases of the loose doctrines emitted in Quinn v. Leathern, [1901J
A. C. 495. It provides that in "trade disputes" (liberally defined) (1) combination
shall not be an element of illegality; (2) "peaceful picketing" shall be lawful;
(3) nothing shall be actionable "on the ground only" that induces breach of an
employment contract, or interferes with anyone's business or employment, or with
anyone's right "to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills"; (4) a trade
union shall not be suable "in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been com-
mitted" by it or on its behalf.
In other than labor cases, English perplexity about the legal significance, if any,
of malice, continued until the House of Lords addressed the subject again in 1925.
They decided that Quinn v. Leathern, supra, meant that, though an individual's malice
will not make his otherwise lawful conduct tortious, a combination'g will. Sorrel
v. Smith, [19261 A. C. 700.
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venience" in support of a decision." And had not Lord Mansfield
earlier? A much more recent precedent showed how open dealing
with policy might be reconcilable with legal tradition. In the
Mogul case36 in 1889 Lord Justice Bowen had laid down this:
"Intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage an-
other in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if
done without just cause or excuse. Such intentional action done
without just cause or excuse is what the law calls a malicious
wrong."
Lord Bowen had done more. He had argued a question of
"just cause or excuse" without much reference to "rights" and
with much to policy. The Mogul case (with which the anti-trust
agitation had given leaders of the American bench and bar occa-
sion to become familiar) was similar on its facts to Bowen v.
Matheson.37 The only difference, except that between steamship
owners and keepers of boarding houses for sailors, was that it was
the combination instead of the outsider that cut rates-cut them
below cost of carriage and gave rebates to shippers in order to
eliminate the plaintiff from the carrying trade from China. If it
could be plainly proved, said Lord Bowen, that "trusts" such as
the defendants were necessarily injurious to the public, "there
might be some reason for thinking that the common law ought to
discover within its arsenal of sound common-sense principles some
remedy commensurate with the mischief." He thought it not
proved; moreover, for the common law to attempt to limit com-
binations of capital "would be only another method of attempting
to set boundaries to the tides." All the defendants had done was
to "pursue to the bitter end a war of competition waged in the
interest of their own trade." And Lord Bowen knew no "natural
standard of 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' (to be determined by
the intense consciousness of judges and juries) beyond which com-
petition ought not in law to go." He concluded accordingly that,
if unattended by any thitherto well recognized sort of illegality,
3Farwe1 v. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 45 Mass. 49, 58 (1842).3 6 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co., L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598, 613
(Ct. of App. 1899), aff'd, [18921 A. C. 25.
37Supra note 11.
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"competition, however severe and egotistical, gives rise to no cause
of action at common law."
In revising this for American use, Holmes faced the fact that
our courts, especially in labor cases, were basing decisions on
standards of fairness or reasonableness determined by their inter-
nal consciousness or unconsciousness. To try to make them stop
would have been like attempting to set boundaries to the tides.
But it would be well if they brought their standards into the open,
and used them with open eyes." In his opinion in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,89 immediately after statement that showing of temporal
damage, "intentionally inflicted,"4 establishes a cause of action
"unless the facts disclose, or the defendants prove, some ground
of excuse or justification," comes the paragraph which there may
still be some who do not know by heart:
"Nevertheless, in numberless instances the law warrants the
intentional infliction of temporal damage because it regards it as
justified. It is on the question of what shall amount to justifica-
tion, and more especially on the nature of the considerations which
really determine or ought to determine the answer to that question,
that judicial reasoning seems to me often to be inadequate. The
true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody
disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously
accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswera-
ble proof. They require a special training to enable any one even
to form an intelligent opinion about them. In the early stages of
law, at least, they generally are acted on rather as inarticulate
8SHe had earlier written thus: "The ground of decision comes down to a propo-
sition of policy of rather a delicate nature concerning the merit of the particular
benefit to themselves intended by the defendants, and suggests a doubt whetherjudges with different economic sympathies might not decide such a case differently
when brought face to face with the issue ... I make these suggestions, not as
criticism of the decisions, but to call attention to the very serious legislative con-
siderations which have to be weighed. The danger is that such considerations should
have their weight in an inarticulate form as unconscious prejudice or half conscious
inclination. To measure them justly needs not only the highest powers of a judge
and a training which the practice of the law does not insure, but also a freedom
from prepossessions which is very hard to attain." Holmes, Privilege, Malice and
Intent (1894) 8 HARe. L. REV. 1, 8-9, reprinted in CoLLErT LEALr PAPERs (1921)
117, 128-9.
39167 Mass. 92, 105-6, 44 N. E. 1077, 1080 (1896).
4 0 0f course damage is "intentionally" inflicted when it results from Intentional
doing of something (underselling competitors, for instance) from which damage was
plainly foreseeable, even if it was neither foreseen nor desired. Clarity as to this
conception is largely due to HoLus, TuE CommoN LAw (1881) Lectures II-V.
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instincts than as definite ideas for which a rational defence is
ready."
III
THE questions of labor law are inescapably political. For
every bit of labor legislation, whether judicial or by a legislative
body, is a step either towards or away from effectuation of "the
most difficult of all political arrangements" . . . that of so adjust-
ing the conflicting claims of propertied and unpropertied classes
"as to give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. '
It is rash to claim to knww in any instance which way the step
is. For taking Madison's as the object of any public policy, the
formation of a sound political conclusion of what tends towards
it" requires not only a special training, but such a special training
as no one has ever had or can yet get. Sound conclusions are
impossible, unless by luck, without a true and complete science
of human animals and their societies and institutions, including
law. And towards such a science the best efforts of the greatest
pioneers to date-Hobbes, Harrington, Adam Smith, Bentham,
Comte, Marx, Sumner, Holmes, Spengler and, perhaps, Pareto-
have been only clear-headed gropings. The best political conclu-
sions possible, for all the perfection of faith with which they may
be cherished, are but guesses. "Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon im-
perfect knowledge."42
Holmes' implication that all decisions are grounded upon
judgments of public policy was not intended to be strictly accu-
rate.43 But probably all labor decisions, however grounded, can
be rationally defended in one or another view of public policy,
and perhaps most are so grounded.
Even in labor law there is a small area, indistinctly bounded,
of judicial agreement. Of course no court would say that physical
-
4 lSpeech of Mr. Madison of Aug. 7, 1787 on the Right of Popular Suffrage (1836)
5 ELrornn's Dm _. 580.
, 
4PHolmes, J., dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630, 40 Sup.
Ci. 17, 22 (1919).4 3He criticized Austin' for intimating that mere motives for decision, "as a
doctrine of political economy oY the political aspirations of the judge, or his govern-
meqt, or the blandishments of the emperor's wife might have been," are legally
immhaterial. "Any motive" of judicial action, declared Holmes, "which can be relied
upon as likely in the generality of cases to prevail, is worthy of consideration."
Early writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (1931) 44 HAy. L. Rzv. 717, 789.
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force, or dangerous threat of it, or fraud, or anything else done
in a labor dispute and clearly within a still generally satisfactory
category of legal wrong, was lawful. And in some cases outside
this class few but rabid partisans would dispute that the results
reached were warranted by the policy of protecting people from
high-handed outrage. Quinn v. Leathem is a striking instance,
on the special facts that before the boycott the plaintiff had of-
fered to surrender to the union and pay fines and dues to get his
men admitted. Carew v. Rutherford" is another. There a con-
tractor had been compelled by strike to pay a fine to the Boston
stonecutters' union because he had sent stone to New York for
cutting. Agreement about such cases does not, however extend
to the doctrines and usages for which they have been used as
authorities.
The clearest showing of one of the views of policy which have
had weight in the disputed areas of labor law is in Holmes' dis-
senting opinions in Massachusetts. In Vejelahn v. Guntner4 the
question was of the lawfulness of picketing, presumably in aid of
an ordinary strike against a single employer for better wages, sup-
posing the pickets' "persuasion and social pressure" to be limited
to "simple advice, not obtruded beyond the point where the other
person was willing to listen, . . . and giving notice of the strike."
Holmes conceded the seriousness of the temporal damage which
the defendants "intended" to inflict. After the passage already
quoted, he stated thus his theory of their justification:
"It has been the law for centuries that a man may set up a
business in a country town too small to support more than one,
though he expects and intends thereby to ruin someone already
there, and succeeds in his intent. In such a case he is not held to
act 'unlawfully and without justifiable cause! . . . The reason, of
course, is that the doctrine generally has been accepted that free
competition is worth more to society than it costs ....
"This illustration . . . shows without the need of further au-
thority that the policy of allowing free competition justifies the
intentional infliction of temporal damage, including the damage
of interference with a man's business, by some means, when the
damage is done not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality
in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade.... The only
44106 Mass. 1 (1870).
45167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
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debatable ground is the nature of the means by which such damage
may be inflicted. We all agree that it cannot be done by force or
threats of force. We all agree, I presume, that it may be done
by persuasion to leave a rival's shop and come to the defendant's.
It may be done by the refusal or withdrawal of various pecuniary
advantages which, apart from this consequence, [i.e., damage],
are within the defendant's lawful control. It may be done by the
withdrawal, or threat to withdraw, such advantages from third
persons who have a right to deal or not to deal with the plaintiff,
as a means of inducing them not to deal with him either as cus-
tomers or servants....
"I have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between
employers and employed is not competition .... If the policy on
which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term
free competition, we may substitute free struggle for life. Cer-
tainly the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the
same class competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts
of temporal interests ....
"There is a notion which latterly has been insisted on a good
deal, that a combination of persons to do what any one of them
lawfully might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful con-
duct unlawful. It would be rash to say that some as yet unformu-
lated truth may not be hidden under this proposition. But in the
general form in which it has been presentet and accepted by many
courts, I think it plainly untrue, both on authority and on princi-
ple .... There was a combination of the most flagrant and dominant
kind in Bowen v. Matheson and in the Mogul Steamship Com-
pany's case, and combination was essential to the success achieved.
But it is not necessary to cite cases; it is plain from the slightest
consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading
of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and
that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means
an ever increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to
me futile to set our faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial
on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless
the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental
conditions of life, are to be changed.
"One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is
that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for
his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capi-
tal, to get his services for the least possible return. Combination
on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other
is the necessary and desirable counterpart if the battle is to be
carried on in a fair and equal way ....
"If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view,
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among other things, to getting as much as they can for their labor,
just as capital may combine with a view to getting the greatest
possible return, it must be true that when combined they have the
same liberty that combined capital has to support their interests
by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those ad-
vantages which they otherwise lawfully control.... The fact, that
the immediate object of the act by which the benefit to themselves
is to be gained is to injure their antagonist, does not necessarily
make it unlawful, any more than when a great house lowers the
price of certain goods for the purpose, and with the effect, of
driving a smaller antagonist from the business."
Having thus stated a theory of competitive justification cov-
ering much more than the "peaceful picketing" involved in Vege-
lahn v. Guntner, Holmes needed to add but little in Plant v.
Woods46 to show its application to the boycott there in question.
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants were house painters, the
plaintiffs being seceders from the defendants' union. Building
contractors, though employing mostly members of the defendants'
union, were also employing the plaintiffs. The defendants bad
threatened strikes unless the employers would make the plaintiffs'
tenure of employment conditional upon their re-joining the de-
fendants' union. The majority opinion had followed' Holmes to the
extent of putting the question as of justification for the temporal
damage threatened, holding, however, that the defendants were not
justified because, as in Carew v. Rutherford,7 their intention was to
coerce by means as potent as a highwayman's, to ends not more law-
ful. Holmes' opinion thus explained the "difference of degree"
between himself and his colleagues:
"To come directly to the point, the issue is narrowed to the
question whether, assuming that some purposes would be a justi-
fication, the purpose in this case of the threatened boycotts and
strikes was such as to justify the threats. That purpose was not
directly concerned with wages. It was one degree more remote,
The immediate object and motive was to strengthen the defend-
46176 Mass. 492, 05, 57 N. E. 1011, 1016 (1900).
47 Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 (1870). This article might well have con-
tained a section dealing with judicial use of "intimidation and coercion," as, or almost
as, sufficient reason for deeming labor pressure unjustifiable. Holmes said of It:
"I pause here to remark that the word 'threats' often is used as if, when it appeared
that threats had been made, it appeared that unlawful conduct had begun. But
it depends on what you threaten.... So as to 'compulsion,' it depends on how you
'compel.'" Vegalabn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 107, 44 N. E. 1081 (1896).
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ants' society as a preliminary and means to enable it to make a
better fight on questions of wages or other matters of clashing in-
terests. I think that unity of organization is necessary to make
the contest of labor effectual, and that societies of laborers may
lawfully employ in their preparation the means which they might
use in the final contest."
In short, if, under modern conditions, there is to be sense
as well as sound in the "equal freedom" of laborers to strive in
lawful ways towards lawful ends, "lawful ways" and "lawful ends"
should not be so restricted as to deprive laborers of freedom to
compete with other laborers for strength to compete with em-
ployers effectually. "Competition, however severe and egotistical"
should justify damage by labor pressures up to a limit of social
tolerableness to be set by educated sympathy and prudence. In-
sistence upon this logical implication of the policy of laissez-fairc
involved no assumption by Holmes of the eternal rightness or ex-
cellence of that policy. It was our policy because it had been
"generally accepted." He recognized that the doctrine that "free
competition is worth more to society than it costs" was already
"disputed by a considerable body of persons, including many
whose intelligence is not to be denied, little as we may agree with
them."48  If he thought it still worth more to society than it
costs, it was doubtless because there seemed no more chance than
in the time of Adam Smith that a government could be endowed
with intelligence enough to undertake to distribute economic goods
by law without doing more harm than good. But the cost of
laissez-fadire was obviously heavy and increasing. General ac-
ceptance might soon fail unless courts construed free competition
-with intelligent sympathy and prudence.
Labor decisions have more often been consonant with another
view of policy than with Holmes'. From the beginning in this
country, when Alexander Hamilton took the reins, paternalism
towards business has competed with laissez-faire. 9 Since this
policy involves leaving business men free of legal hindrances, it
4 8Ve--alahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N. E. 1077, 100 (1896).49See BEARD, ECONOmiC Oiions OF JEFFERsoNIAN DzocRcy (1927). The title
is misleading. Beard presents, largely in their own words, the views of social value
and economic policy of Hamilton, John Adams, Jefferson, John Taylor and their
followers. See also 1 PARINnGTON, MTAL CuRRENTzrs n; AwnRc&, TuouGHT (1927)
267-307.
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is commonly confused with laissez-faire. Perhaps, indeed, it is
only in fusion or confusion with it that laissez-faire has been an
American policy. The fact that the Hamiltonian policy involves
legal favor to business makes it, however, an antithetical opposite
to laissez-faire as conceived by the foremost of its founding
fathers.50 The Hamiltonian policy has been rationally defended
as conducive to the nearest approach to generality of material
security and welfare that practically is possible. The defense
takes concentration of wealth in the hands of the acquisitive
strongest to be inevitable, since never in history has it been long
avoided. The control of wealth and distribution of its annual
product must be left to them, since the wealth would only evapor-
ate in weaker hands. The more they acquire, the greater the an-
nual return available for distribution. And the whole annual re-
turn is always in fact distributed, through payments for work,
wares, entertainment, investments and donations, and not more
inequitably than under any other practicable arrangement. Legal
permission of effectual labor power is certain to result in retarding
the increase of wealth and diminishing the annual distribution.
Therefore law should endeavor to keep labor power within what-
ever may be its limits for the moment, restricting those limits when
practicable.
Though this conclusion is flatly opposed to Holmes', it seems
5OAdam Smith's reason for laissez faire was that experience had shown that
attempts to promote prosperity by law were more likely to do harm than good,
unless to a few favored individuals, whereas if individuals generally are let alone
by law irf socially tolerable pursuits of selfish interests, they are in many cases led
as if by an invisible hand to services to general welfare which are no part of
their intention. SmIm, WrALTH or NATIONS (1776) Bk. iv, c. 2. Of course the letting
alone was not to be carried to a drily logical extreme, which would be anarchy.
Self-seekers were not to be let alone if the results were certain to be bad,
and those of legal regulation certain to be better. Issuance of currency notc
by bankers, for instance, must be regulated, even though it seem violative
of "natural liberty." For "those exertions of the natural liberty of a few
individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought
to be, restrained by the laws of all governments." SmTH, op. cit. supra, Bk. 1i, c. 2.
The main thing was that governments should refrain from affirmative legal assistance
to self-seeking. Then the advancement of commerce and manufactures would follow
the pace, but in due subordination, of that of agriculture, the natural mainstay and
foundation of all welfare, each expanding only as expansion of the other assured a
market. Smr, op. cit. supra, Bk. iii, c. 1. Only the interests of farmers concur with
those of society in general. So legislatures should especially beware of listening to
merchants and manufacturers, "whose interest is never exactly the same with that
of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the
public, and who accordingly have, on many occasions, both deceived and oppressed
it." Srrn, op. cit. supra, Bk. i, c. 2.
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by no means unlikely that he accepted (perhaps not without
qualifications) all the antecedent propositions in the series, his
difference being grounded upon sympathy and prudence.51
Of the labor decisions and usages as to which there has been
judicial discord, nearly every one can be defended or explained
as consonant on the whole either with Holmes' or with the ex-
treme Hamiltonian view of policy. Of course definiteness is im-
possible as to in what cases or to what extent either view has been
the true ground of decision. Many more views, values, interests
and feelings than can be detected must have counted. Radically
anti-capitalist policies have counted by intensifying judicial fears
of labor power. In cases consonant with Holmes' view courts may
often have been moved rather by loyalty to democratic tradition.
There may sometimes, in spite of the near-universality of as-
sumption that wealth and welfare are identical, have been some
influence of the Jeffersonian conception that generality of well-
being depends upon diffusion of opportunity for individuals to
develop self-reliance and self-respect and to experience the satis-
factions as well as pains of work and workmanship, and that in this
interest the increase of wealth might wisely be retarded. - Cases
both ways may sometimes have been decided by moral sentiments
and traditions. Persons born since Holmes said that he "can re-
member when many people thought that, apart from violence or
breach of contract, strikes were wicked."13
IV
NOT least among the instruments that have been uprooting
51This seems indicated by the conclusion of his opinion in Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, 505, 57 N. E. 1011, 1016: "I think it well to add that I cherish no
illusions as to the meaning and effect of strikes. While I think the strike a lawful
instrument in the universal struggle of life, I think it pure phantasy to suppose that
there is a body of capital of which labor as a whole secures a larger share by that
means. The annual product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the luxuries
of the few, is directed to consumption by the multitude, and is consumed by the
multitude always. Organization and strikes may get a larger share for the members
of an organization but, if they do, they get it at the expense of the less organized
and less powerful portion of the laboring mass. They do not create something out
of nothing." Cf. Piou, TimoRy or U.NmxLoYmF ,T (1933) 252-262, 293-S; WrArni
AND W=ARE (1912) 320-45; Hicys, THEORY OF WAGES (1933) 136-229, 179-197;
DOBB, WAGES (1930) 164-9; Marshak, Wages, 1S ENcc. Soc. Scr. 291, especially
bibliography, at 318-9.5 2There is a longer, though inadequate, attempt to explain Jefferson's sodal
values in Nelles, The First American Labor Case (1931) 41 YA=E L. J. 165, 179-189.
5 3Vegalahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N. E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
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old legal takings for granted is Bowen's formula: Intentional
infliction of temporal damage is unlawful unless privileged, with
Holmes' addition that privilege, or justification, depends upon con-
siderations of policy and of social advantage. Law School jurists
were quickly hospitable to this formula. There was no sudden
and universal adoption of it by courts, even after Holmes, in
Aikens v. Wisconsin,4 had put behind it the authority of the
Supreme Court of the United States. There may even yet be
judges who have never heard of it. But legal professional like
other tribal ways change subtly through imitation and suggestion,
without clear awareness by the rank and file that they are chang-
ing. It has come to be considered crude for a judge or lawyer
to talk or write as if any and every sort of thing were necessarily
within the doer's legal rights unless within some clear-cut category
of legal wrong, and the old habit of doing so is near abandonment.
And most judges, at least in courts of last resort, now approach
cases in confused fields, such as that of labor law, with more or
less consistency with the formula. Of course, the vast mass of
cases clearly within definite and generally satisfactory rules, in
which no judge would dream of budging from the policy of stare
decisis, are unaffected by the formulaY. But in other cases its
currency makes judges feel easier than formerly about deciding
as they think best, even where they do not deem it prudent to go
the length of stating the true grounds of their decisions.
The formula has deprived labor law of what used to be its
chief bone of contention. For it dissolves the old mystery of con-
spiracy-how the bare fact of combination can taint lawful be-
havior; Combination matters only when damage would not result
without it. The unlawfulness of inflicting damage, unless the ways
and ends are justifiable, is the same for one as for many, and for
many as for one. "The most innocent and constitutionally pro-
tected of acts or omissions may be made a step in 'an unlawful
enterprise' .... ""-whether of one or many.
Malice is another matter with respect to Which judicial usage
seems, at least on the surface, to have gone far towards consonance
with Holmes. Not for a good while has an important labor case
54195 U. S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 3 (1904).55See CARwozo, TE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 129.56Holmes, J., in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, S (1904).
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been said to turn on "whether the defendants intended rather to
benefit themselves or to harm others," or harm to others said to
be the sole motive of labor pressure. It seems now settled that
if and when malice makes conduct unlawful which without it
would be lawful, malice means "disinterested malevolence" or
"doing a harm malevolently for the sake of the harm as an end in
itself, and not merely as a means to some further end legitimately
desired." 7  And we know of no labor case not long out of date
in which a question described as of malice has even been consid-
ered.,1 Where the word has lately been used at all, it has usually
been with the qualification that it means only "without just cause
or excuse."59 It might, to be sure, be easy to multiply fairly re-
cent instances of judicial language in the old tradition; intimations,
for example, that a labor pressure is "for the purpose" of doing
damage. But such aspersions of motive seem to have lost legal
significance, unless in judicial construction of the Sherman Act.
Like verbal abuse of "scabs" by strikers, they seem usually to be
irrepressible emanations of the heat engendered by conflicts be-
tween workmen and employers. When, however, in a labor case
under the Sherman Act, it is said that "interstate commerce was
the direct object of attack 'for the sake of which the several speci-
fic acts and courses of conduct were done and adopted' .... Jim it al-
most seems that "malice" as imputed by Lord Halsbury has been
re-established as a criterion of unlawfulness, with the substitution
of interstate commerce for competitors as the object of malevolence.
Before the World War there were few signs of any tendency
of judges to follow Holmes in dealing openly and dispassionately,
on grounds of policy, with hard questions of justification. It is
easier for them to rely upon "some natural standard of fairness
or reasonableness" found in their internals, and cloud decisions
with legal verbiage. At least three ways of dodging explanation
of decisions of hard questions have been much followed. One,
5 7Id. at 203, 25 Sup. Ct. at 4.
58 Outside of the field of labor law, malice in the sense of "disinterested malevo-
lence" is sometimes the criterion of statutory guilt or liability, as in Aikens v.
Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 3 (1904); also of common law liability in
such cases, as in Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Blfinn. 145, 119 N. E. 946 (1909).
59As by Taft, C. J., in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor
Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. CL. 72 (1921).
6OBedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 46,
47 Sup. Ct. 522, 524 (1927).
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calling for no special illustration, is to "match the colors of the
case at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out
upon their desk.""' Another, perhaps now become time-dishon-
ored, is that illustrated by Lord Brampton's "judgment" in Quinn
v. Leathem-assertion that the decision is determined by plain-
tiff's, or defendant's, "positive right" or "rights. 02 These "rights"
were commonly of such "property" as is described belowI:
"Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law.
By calling a business 'property' you make it seem like land, and
lead up to the conclusion that a statute [for "statute" here read
"non-owner's course of conduct"] cannot substantially cut down
the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was passed.
An established business no doubt may have pecuniary value and
commonly is protected by law from various unjustified injuries.
But you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing.
It is a course of conduct and like other conduct is subject to sub-
stantial modification according to time and circumstances both
in itself and in regard to what shall justify doing it a harm."0 2
"Property rights" in courses of conduct were sometimes put
as exclusive, sometimes as "equal," sometimes as "superior." But
probably there are now few judges left to whom dogmatic asser-
tion of a plaintiff's "right" could seem quite adequate to dispose
of a claim of justification on grounds of policy.
A subtle modification of technique is illustrated in the pre-
vailing opinion in the Hitchman case.' Though every claim of
justification was set up and knocked down, the stress upon plain-
tiff's rights was always dominant. To the suggestion that the
plaintiff's endeavor "to secure a closed non-union mine through
individual agreements with its employees" furnished some sort of
excuse for coercive pressure to make it a closed union mine,
"It is a sufficient answer, in law, to repeat that plaintiff had a legal
and constitutional right to exclude union men from its employ."
Rights, to be sure, were conceded to be relative. "The cardinal
error of the defendants' position lies in assumption" that their right
"to enlarge union membership by inviting other workingmen to
61Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 55, at 20.62 Holmes, J., dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 133 (1921).03 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 250-259, 38 Sup. Ct.
65, 72-75 (1917). The point here taken was suggested by Cook, Privileges of Labor
Unions in the Struggle for Life (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 779.
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join" is absolute. It is defeated by the plaintiff's right to run
non-union, of whose exercise the defendants had notice, as well as
by the defendants' use of deceitful means.6 In this and many
other opinions concession that even the plaintiff's rights may not
be absolute seems to be with the lips only. The heart feels them
as absolute, and inclines the mind to beg the question at issue-
In whom, as a matter of wise public policy, should the right here
be adjudged to be?
Another way of evading questions of policy may have derived
from Holmes, not with his sanction. In Plant v. Woods' he
described the object of strengthening a union as one degree reinote
from that of raising wages. The Massachusetts court, upon his leav-
ing, seized upon nearness of benefit aimed at as a safe and sane
criterion of the lawfulness of labor pressure. Though, according
to his successor, the contention of interests between employers and
employed is not in a strict sense competition,
"... the principle which warrants competition permits also reason-
able efforts, of a proper kind, which have a direct tendency to
benefit one party in his business at the expense of the other. It
is no legal objection to action whose direct effect is helpful to one
of the parties in the struggle that it is also directly detrimental to
the other."6
Plant v. Woods had already held it unlawful for a union to coerce
employers ti discharge non-member workmen. When the court
had bowed slightly to Holmes, conceding that economic coercion
might sometimes have a quasi-competitive justification, explanation
of Plant v. Woods on the ground that the benefit aimed at was
indirect, as Holmes himself could be construed as saying, doubtless
seemed more satisfyingly definite than the explanation with which
Holmes had been answered in that case by the spokesman of the
majority of the court.6"
64Few judges construed the decision as determined by the defendants' use of
deceitful means, even after Taft, C. J., had said: "The unlawful and deceitful
means used were quite enough to sustain the decision of the court without more."
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council, 257 U. S. 184, 211,
42 Sup. Ct. 72, 79 (1921). See the thirty-eight subsequent cases resting on the
Hitchman case listed in LANis, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934) 129n.65Loc. dt. supra note 46.6 6 Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 358, 74 N. E. 603, 605 (1905) (Italics in-
serted).67
"The necessity that the plaintiffs should join this association is not so great,
nor is its relation to the rights of the defendants, as compared with the right of the
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The Massachusetts courts, being scrupulous, made directness
the true ground of some decisions. Clearly no benefit can be more
direct than that of having jobs. It was soon held, accordingly,
quite lawful for union masons to strike to compel contractors to
give members of their union the work of pointing masonry, thitherto
done by specialized pointers. This strike was not tainted by the
object found vicious in Plant v. Woods-that of forcing men to
join the union. For the pointers, being untrained at laying brick
or stone, were ineligible to join the union. The effect was to make
them unemployable at their trade. But, as was said in the opinion,
competition "is always selfish, often sharp, and sometimes deadly.""8
Sometimeg, however, the logic of directness has been found
evitable. The musicians' union, pursuant to its rules, would not
allow a union organist to work in a moving picture theatre unless
at least four other musicians were employed. For as good a non-
union organist as he wanted the theatre owner had to pay more than
twice the union rate of wages. It was held unlawful for the union
to enforce its rule. However direct might be the benefit of more
work for union men, the attempt to reap it interfered with the
theatre owner's right to a free flow of labor. And the union's purpose
of having jobs created for its members was "indirect." '
Of course the benefit of the closed shop was indirect in
Massachusetts and strikes for it unlawful. The additional reason
that the closed shop gives unions a monopoly of the labor market
was stated for a while.7" But its force evaporated when, in a case
in which employers testified to a preference for dealing "with one
strong union, under good control and management," a trade agree-
ment for the closed shop was held lawful. 71 Though such a trade
plaintiffs to be free from molestation, such as to bring the acts of the defendants
under the shelter of the principles of trade competition." Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass.
492, 502, 57 N. E. 1011, 1015 (1900).
6 8 Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906). The anomaly of this
lawfulness of getting men thrown out of work because union men want their Jobs
as jobs (Pickett v. Walsh) and the unlawfulness of getting them thrown out of
work because they will not join the union (Plant v. Woods) has variously amused
and irked law review writers. See LAzrns, CASES ON LABOR LAW 317, 319 nn.
69Haverhill Strand Theatre v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918).
The opinion is by the judge who wrote in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E.
753 (1906). That it is justifiable for a musicians' union to enforce the "none unless
several" rule was held in Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians
Assn., 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092 (1912).
7 OAberthaw Const. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N. E. 478 (1907);
Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911).7 1Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717 (1914).
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agreement may lawfully provide that only members of the union
be employed unless when there are not enough available, a union
may not lawfully get enforcement of such a provision to the extent
of having a non-union fellow workman discharged.7 - So when a
well-advised Massachusetts union, through lawful strikes for higher
wages or otherwise, has brought a body of employers to the point
of willingness to agree to the closed shop, the employers first dis-
charge all their men, then execute the trade agreement, and then
re-employ those of the men discharged who belong to the union.73
Testing of justification by directness of benefit aimed at has not
been confined to Massachusetts. At several times and places union
carpenters, working for building contractors, have refused to install
doors, sashes or other "trim" made in factories where non-union
carpenters were employed. The New York Court of Appeals held
such a boycott lawful.74 The reason stated (this was in 1917; that
court would later have written otherwise) was that extension of
the union among mill-hand carpenters was in the "primary" and
"direct" interest of the carpenters who worked on buildings. The
Massachusetts court held such a boycott unlawful." "It is plain,"
it said, "that there is a distinct line of demarcation between the
nature of the work performed by the maker of finish (or trim)
and the installer of it .... Obviously it is of more concern to
workers who obtain their livelihood in a particular craft that they
all should join a union, than that workers in other lines of endeavor
should become unionized."
V
ONE clear unity in the labor law of Holmes' time was in agree-
ment that the policy of free competition justifies labor pressure for
some ends by some means. In 1921 the Hamiltonian Chief Justice
at whose left hand Holmes was sitting said this:
"Labor unions were organized out of the necessities of the
situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer.... Union was essential to give laborers an opportunity
72Berry v. Donovan, 188 Blass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905); Shinsky v. Tracey,
226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (1917); cf. Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Blass. 99, 121 N. E.
790 (1919).
7 3LANDis, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934) 378 n.
74Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).75 Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett 260 Mass. 45, 66, 157 N. E. 82, 89 (1927).
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to deal on an equality with their employer. They united . . . to
leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him
to make better terms with them .... The right to combine for
such a lawful purpose has in many years not been denied by any
court. The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful economic
struggle or competition between employer and employees as to the
share or division between them of the joint product of labor and
capital."
7 6
This legality, never before so lucidly explained, of simple strikes
for wages, hours or working conditions, had happened, to be sure,
without adjudication. That no court had for many years denied
it was because denial had seemed imprudent to even the boldest
Hamiltonian extremists on the bench. It seems clear that the judge
who wrote for the majority in Plant v. Woods would have liked to."
But the decision that strikers, however lawless their striking, cannot
constitutionally be compelled to go back to work,78 had clinched
the impracticability of preventing strikes judicially. Courts which
7GTaft, C. J., in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council,
257 U. S. 184, 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 78 (1921).
771e said: "It is well to see what is the meaning of this threat to strike ...
It means more than that the strikers will cease to work.... It means that those who
have ceased work will, by strong, persistent, and organized persuasion of every
description, do all that they can to prevent the employer from procuring workmen
to take their places. It means much more. It means that, if these peaceful measures
fail, the employer may reasonably expect that unlawful physical injury may be done
to his property; that attempts in all the ways practised by organized labor will be
made to injure him in his business, even to his ruin, if possible; and that, by the
use of vile and opprobrious epithets and other annoying conduct, and actual and
threatened personal violence, attempts will be made to intimidate those who enter
or desire to enter his employ .... Even if the intent of the strikers . . . be to
discountenance all actual or threatened injury .. . except that which is the direct
necessary result of the interruption of the work, . . . still with full knowledge of
what is to be expected they give the signal . ... Such is the nature of the threat,
and such the degree of coercion and intimidation involved in it." Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 496-7, 57 N. E. 1011, 1013 (1900).
The substantial accuracy of this as description of most strikes which are bitterly
fought by employers, might not be challenged by any open-minded observer. Holmes
never challenged it. It was notwithstanding its accuracy that he thought that legal
restraints upon labor efforts at self-help should not go to the extreme of precluding
their possibility of effectualness. And it was only for so long as sympathy and
prudence have constructed no machinery through which the struggle for life may
be carried on at less cost, in a not less "fair and equal way," that he thought that
the cost of strikes should be borne as part of the cost of the policy of free competi-
tion. He concurred in the opinion in which Mr. Justice Brandeis said that he
did not "wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction"
to the "right of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the
justification of self-interest"; and suggested that legislation, "limiting group rights
of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive
method of trial by combat." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 488 (1921).7 8Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline  -- 13 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev.  542 1935-1936
HOLMES AND LABOR LAW
may have thought this unfortunate did the next best thing: forbade
picketing altogether.79 But perhaps no courts, or few, now would
(or could, since enactment of legalizing statutes) deny, as an abstract
proposition, that in a lawful strike picketing can be lawful, if
limited and conducted as sedately as Chief Justice Taft prescribed
in the case last quoted from. The militant and sinister word
"picket" was to have no legal recognition. To enjoin pickets only
from violence and from behaving "in a threatening and abusive
manner" was insufficient. Pickets were to be free gently to persuade
those who accepted their offers of conversation. But they must
not be importunate or otherwise offensive, let alone defamatory.
"To prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of groups
of pickets, but to allow missionaries," the number was limited in
the instance to one at each entrance to the factory-but with
permission to judges in other cases to fix the number as seemed
fitting.
Another abstract proposition which it seems safe to say no court
disputes is that when, in an otherwise lawful strike, violence by
strikers is so serious and persistent as to "characterize the whole
campaign" the strike is unlawful and picketing should be enjoined
altogether."0 But disagreement in practice is here so great that
agreement in theory is almost empty. Even on better evidence than
colored affidavits,"' questions of the extent of strike violence and
of union responsibility for it must be often doubtful. Judicial con-
victions of policy may turn the balance. All activities in aid of the
Railway Shopmen's Strike of 1922 were restrained by some federal
judges on the theory that the strikers' nation-wide campaign of
7S"There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than
there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (S. D. Iowa, 1905).
For dtatioans indicating "weight of authority" as to picketing, and the other
principal subjects of judicial difference in labor law as well, see footnotes in LmDis,
CAsEs ox LAoR LAW and in FAx-UxmTER AD Gm-, Tim LABOR Ju i .o
(1930) c. 1; and Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 Yis L. J. 682. OAEs,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CO-NrC.S (1927), seems, to its date, exhaustive.8 OAmerican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council, 257 U. S. 184,
205, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 77 (1921).
8 1
"Experience . . . has caused me to be so incredulous of affidavits that I
have required . . . the presence of the chief witnesses upon each side .. . A com-
parison of the picture produced by their testimony with that produced by their
affidavits has proven the utter untrustworthiness of affidavits. Such documents are
packed with falsehoods, or with half-truths, which in such a matter are more de-
ceptive than deliberate falsehoods." Great N. R. Co. v. Brousseau, 286 Fed. 414,
416 (N. Dak. 1923).
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violence made the strike an unlawful restraint of interstate com-
merce. 2 Judge Amidon enjoined in his district only specific unlaw-
ful tactics; and found that "the officers of the union in charge of
the strike, and a great majority of the men, have joined with the
peace officers in a sincere effort to conduct the strike in a lawful
and orderly manner." 's  Even where the lawfulness of "peaceful
picketing"' in a lawful strike was not denied, it has been open to
individual judges to construe petty fracases as warranty for pro-
hibiting all further picketing. The New York Court of Appeals has
recommended to New York judges the course which Holmes pressed
for unsuccessfully in Massachusetts in Vegelahn v. Guntner:84 in-
junction only of torts by pickets, even though some violent torts
may already have been committed, unless or until it is really plain
that violence will characterize the whole campaign. "An injunction
does not issue as punishment for the past. Its only legitimate end
is protection for the future." 85  The American Steel Foundries
case," in which the picketing had been intimidatory before the
injunction, accords. But appellate courts are impotent to control
the fact finding ways of courts below.
The American Steel Foundries case went with Holmes a step
beyond concession of the lawfulness of simple strikes and gentle-
manly picketing. Following the statement already quoted that
combination is a lawful instrument for workmen in competition
with their own employers, Chief Justice Taft continued:
"To render this combination at all effective, employees must
make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful
to have as many as may be in the same trade in the same community
82These were the "Daughtery injunction" cases, of which the chief was United
States v. Railway Employees Dept., A. F. of L., 283 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ill. 1922);
286 Fed. 228 (N. D. I1. 1923); and 290 Fed. 978 (N. D. I11. 1923). The "veritable
reign of terror" evidenced by the affidavits was thought to show that the strike was
for the "primary purpose" of crippling and destroying interstate commerce. See
283 Fed. at 491-2 and 290 Fed. at 978, 982, both cited supra. For the text of the
"temporary restraining order" see Fi~xruRTER AND GREw , TrlE LAIoR INytrNcnox
(1930) 253 ff.; for that of the "permanent injunction," LANDIS, CASES OU LAnoit LAW
262 ff.83Loc. cit. supra note 81. In view of the danger that pickets might be In.
timidated or attacked, or subjected to trumped up charges, by armed guards or
strikebreakers, Judge Amidon permitted three pickets at each entrance to railway
property.
84167 Mass. 92, 95-6, 104-5, 44 N. E. 1077, 1079-80 (1896).
85Cardozo, C. J, in Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 315, 174 N. E. 690, 693
(1931).
8OAmerican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council, 257 U. S.
184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921).
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united, because in the competition between employers they are
bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in
the neighborhood. Therefore they may use all lawful propaganda
to enlarge their membership and especially among those whose labor
at lower wages will injure their whole guild."
This view was applied to these facts: The plaintiff was operating
open-shop, after a long shut-down, with a small force of 350 men,
of whom 150 were of skilled trades and working at less than union
wages. The defendants were a combination of 37 skilled trade local
unions of steel product plant workmen of the neighborhood. There
was no strike in the plaintiff's plant, unless the quitting of two men
can be called one. The defendants' object, held lawful, was to
induce the plaintiff's men to strike in the interest of preventing
the wage cuts which the defendants' employers would naturally
attempt to make in order to meet the plaintiff's low wage competi-
tion in sales of products. The court did not say in words that it
was legalizing a secondary boycott.8 7 But the distinctive element
was clearly there-coercion through strangers to a competition, in
what was called in Massachusetts the "strict sense" of that word
(the strangers being either persuaded or coerced), for the advan-
tage of one of the competitors. The plaintiff's men were not united
in immediate interest with the defendants; in fact they might have
suffered had they struck. The plaintiff was a stranger to the
defendants' competition with their own employers; the conflict of
defendants' interests with plaintiff's was "indirect." Yet it was
held that the defendants might properly, if they could (the if, to
be sure, seems large), persuade the plaintiff's men to become their
cat's-paws and, by striking, coerce the plaintiff to pay union wages
in the interest of security for their continuance in plaintiff's com-
petitors' plants.
In New York, not long after, there was a similar recognition of
Holmes' view of competition and what it should justify. Efforts
to unionize small restaurants and moving picture theatres have been
frequent. Since such establishments have but few employees, easily
replaceable, strikes, if possible at all, are usually impotent. Per-
STApplying the word boycott only to secondary boycotts, we Ahall usually hence-
forth, as heretofore, omit the adjective. Primary boycotts--imple strikes, for in-
stance, of the sort everywhere held lawful-are scarcely ever called such. For usdeess
attempts to differentiate boycotts, for legal purposes, with an exactness which will
not be delusive, see OAxEs, op. cit. supra note 79, at 602-606.
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suasion of potential customers not to patronize has been more
effective. Picketing with that object has the boycott characteristic.
It persuades "strangers" to both union and restaurant proprietor,
to coerce the latter by withholding patronage. It was held lawful
in Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin,s8 Judge Andrews saying:
"A labor union .. may be as interested in the wages of those
not members .. as in its own members because of the influence
of one upon the other. .... Economic organization to-day is not
based on the single shop. Unions believe that wages may be in-
creased, collective bargaining maintained, only if union conditions
prevail, not in some single factory but generally. That they may
prevail [a union] may call a strike and picket the premises of an
employer with the intent of inducing him to employ only union
labor. And it may adopt either method separately. Picketing
without a strike is no more unlawful than a strike without picketing.
... Resulting injury is incidental and must be endured."
It is not likely that this case would be taken as overruling Auburn
Draying Co. v. Wardell. 9 The boycott there looked very different.
The plaintiff was a trucking company at Auburn running open
shop, employing 45 teamsters. "The plaintiff neither encouraged
nor forbade its employees to join" a newly formed teamsters' union,
which demanded that plaintiff compel its' men to join. Twenty-two
other local unions of diverse trades combined with the teamsters'
union through a Central Labor Union to enforce this demand by
boycott. And "dealers, ice deliverers, bakers, butchers, builders,
plumbers and contractors, because of the notices, warnings and
declarations of the defendants, in varying and serious degrees dis-
continued business with the plaintiff and refused further to employ
it to do carting, hauling or collection work for fear of loss of
business and labor troubles. ' ' 1°
It seems probable that Holmes would have agreed that this
boycott was unjustifiable. But not because he found the benefit
aimed at "remote" or "indirect". It is hard to see how he could
have formulated any definite looking criterion of distinction from
boycotts he thought justifiable whose exactness would not have been
delusive. Our best guess is that on the particular circumstances
he might have found a clear and present danger of tyrannous labor
88245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
89227 N. Y. 1, 124, N. E. 97 (1919).
90
.d at 5, 124 N. E. at 99.
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domination of the city, which both sympathy and prudence called
for checking.
If this guess is right, it may explain the seeming inconsistency
with his general position of his position in the Danbury Hatters'
case.9 l The union hatters' case for justification, had it been
argued, 2 would have been the same as that of the unions of steel
product plant and restaurant employees whose boycotts have been
since held lawful." To secure the effectiveness of their union, even
in the southwestern corner of Connecticut, they had to extend it
to Loewe's shop. A strike of Loewe's men seems to have failed
because strike breakers unamenable to persuasion were substituted.
What less could they do, with the faintest chance that it might be
effectual, than combine with members of the American Federation
of Labor throughout the country to press Loewe to unionize his
factory by not dealing, and persuading others not to deal, with
shops which carried Loewe's hats in stock, using only notoriety
and persuasion to make the boycott count? Unless the menace of
a boycott so extensive accounts for Holmes' concurrence, it seems
irreconcilable with his dissent in the later interstate boycott cases.
The guess of course is doubtful. At this distance the boycott seems
not very terrifying. But the fact that a national "central labor
union" was vigorously active in it may have made it seem ominous.
Of course a judge may have many reasons for not dissenting
when dissent seems useless. Having concurred in the decision that
the complaint against the hatters was proof against demurrer, Holmes
may have felt precluded from dissenting from affirmance of the
judgment. And he may have written the court's opinion mainly
to prevent another justice from saying what he would have. But
he probably regretted later that he put it solely upon authority.04
91Complaint held good against demurrer: Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28
Sup. Ct. 301 (1908): judgment for plaintiff after trial aff'd, Lawlor v. Loewe, 235
U. S. 522, 35 Sup. CL 170 (1915), Holmes writing.
92We understand that counsel for the Danbury Hatters did not argue that the
boycott would be lawful at common law, virtually confining themselves to the point
that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act could not sensibly be construed as applying to
the activities of labor unions.93American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council, 257 U. S. 184,
42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921); Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 24S N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130
(1927).9 40n the main point he said only that, "whatever may be the law otherwise,
Eastern States Lumber Dealers v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951
(1913), establishes that, irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe
its- intimation, the circulation of a list of 'unfair dealers,' manifestly intended to
put the ban upon those whose names appear therein, among an important body of
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For its authority was a main reliance of the judges who wrote for
the majority in the Duplex and Stonecutters' casesY,
In those cases the settled rule relied on was that, given "intent"
or manifest tendency to affect interstate commerce sufficiently, the
Sherman Act prohibits secondary boycotts indiscriminately. This
was deemed so established as to outlaw close thinking about par-
ticular boycotts. Whether a boycott is lawful or unlawful at com-
mon law was said to be "of minor consequence" and "immaterial". 0
It was not in words denied that the standard of lawfulness under
the Sherman Act is reasonableness, and that "what is reasonable
must be determined by the application of principles of the common
law as administered in federal courts"." But whether the particular
possible customers combined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of
such reports, is within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act if it is intended to
restrain and restrains commerce among the States. It requires more than the blind-
ness of justice not to see that" what was done by the United Hafters and the
American Federation of Labor was of the same description as what was done by
the lumber dealers.
9 5Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522 (1926).
Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissented in both. In the Stonecutters' case, supra,
Sanford and Stone JJ., made clear that they concurred unwillingly with the majority,
on the authority of the Duplex case, supra.
The plaintiff in the Duplex case, supra, was the only one of five manufacturers
of large printing presses (there were no more in the United States) who ran an
open shop. The other four notified the machinists' union that they could not
afford to renew their closed shop trade agreements unless plaintiff's plant, which
was remote in Michigan, were also unionized. A strike of plaintiff's few union
men having proved futile, union machinists in New York, and perhaps to some extent
elsewhere (the boycott being described in the majority opinion as "nation-wide"),
systematically refused to install or repair presses of plaintiff's manufacture. They
got some help from unions of other trades; some truckmen, at least, refused to haul
plaintiff's presses in the New York region. The majority opinion leaves it obscure
how much this outside help amounted to; the dissenting opinion treats it as negligible.
In the Stonecutters' case, supra, the boycott was of the pattern held lawful In
New York in Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. V. 582 (1917). Plaintiffs
were quarriers and fabricators of stone in Indiana. After they had terminated
relations with the defendant union, its member stonecutters, under union discipline,
declined, "in a large number of cities and in many states," to work on stone from
plaintiffs' quarries.
In both cases, of course, the object of the boycotts was to compel the plaintiffs
to establish union conditions.
9 6Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 466 (1921); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 50 (1926).
-
9 TBrandeis, J., id. at 58., For the history of judicial construction of the Sherman
Act in labor cases, and of the labor provisions of the Clayton Act, see BERAN, LABOR
AND THE S 1muAN AcT (1930); and FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, Titr LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930).
That hard and fast criteria of reasonableness under the Sherman Act may some-
times give way to reasonableness under the particular circumstances is clearly shown
by Nat. Assn. of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263 U. S. 403,
44 Sup. Ct. 148 (1923), decided by a unanimous court, Holmes writing. The do-
fendants, a combination of organized employers with the union of their workmen,
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boycotts were reasonable according to the principles of that common
law was treated as not open for examination.
By the most orthodox conventions, whether the Sherman Act
prohibited restraint of interstate commerce by such boycotts de-
pended on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the boycotts
as determined by common law principles; and the mandate of those
principles was open for the Court's consideration, unless precedents
precluded. The Hatters' case was not necessarily preclusive; all
that it necessarily settled was that a boycott affecting interstate
commerce is unreasonable when such vast forces as those of the
American Federation of Labor, aided by vast forces of the con-
suming public, carry it to the point of clear and present danger
of oppressive labor tyrannyB Before the Stonecutters' case the
Steel Foundries case had declared what, arguably, was already law
when the Duplex case was decided earlier in the same year; that
a boycott on not too dangerously vast a scale, and pruned by
injunction of prunable improprieties, if any, may, on common law
principles, be a reasonable and lawful way for laborers to effect
the lawful end of extending their union among those of the same
trade whose labor at lower wages would injure their whole guild.
That case's dicta restricting boycotts to a trade and a neighborhood
were not decisions; only a boycott by allied trades in a neighborhood
was in question. It would seem in the Duplex and Stonecutters'
cases to have been open to the Court to consider whether, in the
particular circumstances of each case, the particular boycotts were
reasonable or unreasonable means to the end whose reasonableness
the Steel Foundries case attests. Whether any lesser means than
boycott could have been effectual to that end might, in each case,
have been a relevant question; and if it could not, it might become
relevant to determine whether, in each instance, limitation to a
neighborhood would be reasonable or arbitrary. It would seem
that the question of the reasonableness of limitation to closely allied
trades would not, in either instance, be very important; 9 if in
had a complete national monopoly of everything to do with the manufacture of
hand-blown window gls. Their agreement provided for limitation of output, and
equitable division of the available work among the union blowers, and of the available
blowers among the plants in operation. This was held reasonable. For the industry,
in competition with machine made glass, was dying.9 8 Cj. Brandeis, J., in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn.,
274 U. S. 63-4, 47 Sup. Ct. 530-31 (1926).
99For it would seem that machinists are of the same trade whether they work
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the Duplex case it seemed unreasonable for the machinists to get
aid from truckmen, that excess might have been prunable by in-
junction without relegating workmen in the other four printing
press factories to a wage-scale dependent upon the Michigan plain-
tiff's. We are not arguing, merely indicating arguments that were
technically open.
The fact that they were open is not least among the gains of
the Holmesian policy in the decade prior to the depression. Fur-
ther detail of the state of labor law with relation to that policy
would add little but tediousness. On what has been the principal
question in an important department which we may seem to have
slighted, consonance with Holmes' theory of justification seems to
have come about without adjudication. Since the Senate proceedings
relative to the nomination of Judge Parker to the Supreme Court in
1930,100 the doctrine that "individual non-union contracts" between
workmen and employers should be sacred, seems to have been ab-
rogated, consonantly with Holmes' theory, by public opinion, even
where not by statute.'' As to when labor pressure may be unjustifia-
ble because it interferes with an employer's business contracts, there
have been some cases. 10 2  But we know of no expression by Holmes
or a clearly Holmesian court on such a question. So also as to
many minor or infrequent sorts of questions.103
on printing presses or other mechanisms. And stonecutters similarly. But of course
the Massachusetts view (supra note 75) was open-that the interests of men of the
same trade who perform one process can have no close connection with the interests
of men who perform another.100Extracts are published in LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW 141 ff.; cf. id. at 181-2.
'
0 1 See Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions (1936) 30 ILL. L.
REv. 854, from which most of the citations given, infre note 113, have been taken.1 0 2An interesting one concerned union hatters at Danbury: R. & W. Hat Shop
v. Scully, 98 Conn. 1, 118 AtI. 55 (1922). In a time of shortage of "hats in the
rough," and consequent irregularity of employment for union hat "finishers," closed
shop manufacturers of "hats in the rough" were successfully pressed, through their
workmen, to give priority in deliveries to closed shop over non-union manufacturers
of finished hats. In consequence, a manufacturer of "hats in the rough" broke a
contract to deliver such hats to the plaintiff, a non-union manufacturer of finished
hats. Plaintiff was held entitled to damages from officers of the union held charge-
able with notice of the contract. Beach, J., dissenting, said: "A stranger to a
contract may not, for his own benefit and without legal justification, knowingly
induce a breach of it, but he is not bound to assist in its performance." The general
question in such cases is when, or whether, other people's contracts should be legal
barriers to a union's efforts to benefit its members.0 3 Such for instance as the legitimacy of pressure to prevent use of labor-saving
machinery. A few years ago it would have been unthinkable that an important court
would view such an object sympathetically. See Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 red.
912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). There is now, however, a decision that a painters' union Isjustified in preventing its members from working for an employer who has invested in
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It has been shown that Holmes' theory of justification has had
impressive recognition in the Steel Foundries case and by the New
York Court of Appeals. Holmesian cases in other courts could be
cited. And there have been many consonant cases, reaching
Holmesian results, though not, or questionably, on Holmesian
grounds. 14 But we are not dealing with numerical state of authority.
Nor are we undertaking to detect and exhibit all the tangled ways
that courts have followed in labor cases. Everyone knows that the
trend of decision has been anti-Holmesian, with exceptions and
concessions. The following is a clear avowal of convictions that
may underlie many anti-Holmesian decisions:
"Can the courts step in between capital and labor to strike
the medium and balance the scales? . . . The courts cannot find
the balancing point by boxing the compass of judicial opinion from
extreme radicalism to ultra-conservatism. They must stand at all
times as the representatives of capital, of captains of industry,
devoted to the principle of individual initiative, protect property
and persons from violence and destruction, ... and yet save labor
from oppression, and conciliatory toward the removal of the workers'
just grievances."' 5
This Hamiltonian candor, rare in public utterance since Hamilton
himself, has sometimes been unfairly aspersed. The point of view
expressed is not indefensible intellectually. It is only detestible-
except to those who hold it. The imprudence of public expression
of it may not be least among the reasons why judicial reasoning on
questions of justification seems often to have been inadequate.
VI
IN view of the Duplex case which preceded and the Stonecutters'
which followed, it may seem that the Supreme Court's inclination
towards Holmes in the Steel Foundries case had slight significance.
We think momentous the concession that it is justifiable for laborers
to strive, by lawful means, to extend their union, "and especially
among those whose labor at lower wages will injure their whole
a corporation that uses paint spraying machines. Bayer v. Brotherhood, 103 N. J. Eq.
257, 154 AtL 759 J1931).
3O4,An instance is the first important New York case in which it was held lawful
to strike for the closed shop. Nat. Prot. Assn. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E.
369 (1902). The opinion seems to rest either upon democratic convictions as to
human "rights" and liberties or upon the old assumption that nothing can be
unlawful unless within some definite category of wrong, or upon both.0 5 Schwartz & Jaffee v. Hillman, 115 Misc. 61, 189 N. Y. Supp. 21 (1921).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline  -- 13 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev.  551 1935-1936
552 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW
guild." It is true that the qualifications with which it was coupled
would make almost any effectual means unlawful. But the
Holmesian sound kept ringing. And there was not a little per-
ception, with indignation or amusement, of its contradiction by the
Hamiltonian sense. Malicious persons diagnosed the concession as
a trick to temper the social wind which the Duplex case had raised,
and which Truax v. Corrigan"' (in which decision was to be
announced two weeks later) would be certain to augment.
Later decisions kept that wind from quite abating even during
the boom. The Court held labor unions suable, and threatened
them with "intent" to restrain interstate commerce in the Coronado
cases." 7 It held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit a boycott
by employers, aimed to destroy closed shop conditions by inducing
dealers in building materials to refuse to sell them to contractors
who continued to hire only union men.108 The boycott was viewed
as local to California; but, in the light of other cases, the fairness
of the findings that restraint of interstate commerce was neither
substantial nor intended was not too clear to question. It held
unconstitutional the law providing that women in industry should
not be paid less than fixed minima in the District of Columbia.109
It emasculated the labor provision of an earlier Railway Labor
Act."' It held a labor leader punishable for the contempt of
calling a strike in violation of an injunction issued pursuant to a
statute making arbitration compulsory."' The statute, which he
had challenged vainly, was held unconstitutional in later cases. 112
And its decision in the Stonecutters' case disturbed even some of
those who believed prosperity had firm foundations, and that the
new economics of high wages was making inevitably for industrial
106257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921). A state statute forbidding the Issuance
of injunctions in labor disputes was held unconstitutional, Holmes, Brandeis, Pitney
and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. It was thought that the statute, as construed by the
state court, would in effect legalize picketing of the "Don't patronize" sort. In the
instance the picketing had been abusive and disorderly.0 7 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570(1922); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct.
551 (1925).
10 8 1nd. Assn. of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 49 Sup. Ct. 403
(1925).
10 9 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
1 1 OPa. R. Co. v. Railway Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72, 43 Sup. Ct. 278 (1923);
Pa. R. System Federation v. Pa. R. Co., 267 U. S. 205, 45 Sup. Ct. 307 (1925).1 1 1Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 42 Sup. Ct. 277 (1922).
112 Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas Court of Ind. Relations, 262 U. S. 572, 43
Sup. Ct. 630 (1923); and 267 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441 (1925).
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good feeling. Holmes concurred in several of these cases. But
news of their results, and little more, reached a large public. The
reactions of labor leaders, and persons sympathetically disposed
towards labor, were not discriminating as to their policy or justice.
These reactions have joined many other social forces to pro-
duce a flock of statutes.113 Some of them, however motived, go far
towards enacting Holmes' views of what, if laissez faire is still to
be our policy, organized laborers should be free to do to, make effec-
tual their desires for economic sunshine,'14 and one provides for
an administrative tribunal to serve as guardian of their freedoms.115
11 3NomR.s-LA GuARDiA Acr, 47 STAT. 70-73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-11S
(1935) (described infra note 114) with which the following state statutes approach
identity in many or some provisions: Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215;
Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12; La. Laws 1934, c. 203; Aid. Laws 1935, c. 574; Mass. Acts
1935, c. 407; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416; N. Y. Laws 1935, cc. 11, 298, 299 and 477
[adding these new sections: Sec. 17 to the Civil Rights Law, Sec. 753-a to the
Judiciary Law, and Secs. 882-a and 876-a to the Civil Practice Act; and amending
Penal Law § 600 (4) (5)]; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355;
Utah Laws 1933, c. 15; Wash. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 7; Wis. Laws 1931, C. 376.
The following statutes with similar objects are less like in form; IlL Laws 1925,
378, Laws 1933, 588; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 207, Laws 1932, c. 244; Pa. Laws
1031, Acts 310, 311, Laws 1933, Act 219. The following limit injunctions only as
to yellow dog contracts: Ariz. Laws 1931, c. 19; Cal. Laws 1933, 1478; Ohio
Laws 1931, 562. The following restrict use of injunctions in some respects, with-
out specification as to yellow dog contracts: Me. Laws 1933, c. 261; Wyo. Laws
1933, c. 37. '
The NATIOzzAL LABOR RElAi0ioS Acr, 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§
151-166 (1935) is described infra note 115. The E=ncycr RAiLwAY TnA S-
PORTATIONq ACT, 48 STAT. 211 (1933) provided for conferences between the federal
railway Coordinator and committees representing railway employees, and empowered
the Coordinator to set up regional boards of adjustment for labor disputes. The
newest RAIWAY LABOR AcT, P. L. No. 442, 73rd Cong. (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 8,
provides criminal penalties for interference by employers with railway employees'
rights of self-organization and representation by representatives of their own choosing;
and sets up an elaborate machinery of mediation, and (if agreed to) arbitration, of
railway labor disputes. Recent amendments of Sec. 77 of the BA.-1Urrc Acr
11 U. S. C. A. § 77 (o), (p), and (q), advise federal judges that the provisions of
the Norris-La Guardia Act apply in receiverships; see 4 I: "E rmAloAL JUIDICAL
AssN,. BuLL. (Nov. 1935) 7; Note (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 372.
114 Those of the Norris-LaGuardia Act pattern, among other things, (1) deprive
courts of jurisdiction, in cases growing out of labor disputes, to base either legal
or equitable relief upon "yellow-dog" contracts, or enjoin participants in a labor
dispute (unless for fraud or violence) from publicity about the dispute (by picketing
or otherwise) or from urging or causing persons to strike or join a union, "labor
disputes" and "participants" being so defined that injunctions against boycotts would
seem usually to be precluded; (2) provide that no labor injunction shall issue
(unless a temporary restraining order to become void within five days) except on
testimony in open court, that appeals from them have priority upon appellate court
calendars, and that charges of "indirect criminal contempt" of injunctions be triable
by jury.
1"5 The NATONAL LABOR Rnr L ONs ACT, supra note 113, empowers a federal
board to take effective measures to prevent restriction by employers of wvorkmen's
freedom of self organization and right to be represented in collective bargaining
by representatives of their own choosing. The Board may investigate (with power
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Even if the living Constitution should kill these statutes, judicial
inclination towards Holmes' views might be left stronger than it
has been. On the other hand, it may be that the labor injunction,
and the whole mass of law and statutes clustered about it, will
become unimportant, and "industrial relations" be regulated by the
new big businesses of industrial espionage and strike breaking,
backed by military force.116
Holmes surely would have been for trial of the new statutory
"social experiments that an important part of the community
desires", even though they seemed futile or even noxious to him
and those whose judgment he most respected." Even if proposed
new ways of trying to protect life, liberty and property were in-
consistent, instead of consistent, with laissez faire, he would not for
such a reason have thought they should not have their chance. He
adhered to that policy only because it seemed to him unlikely that
any substitute yet pressed could be effectual to make our conditions
less remote from those of an ideal commonwealth.11 He would
have granted that conditions as they have been differed only in
degree, and that not large, from those of the Hobbesian "state of
nature"-a "war of every man against every man" in which, because
some carry invasion of others further than their own security
requires, if those who "would be glad to be at ease within modest
bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would
not be able, long time, standing only on their own defense, to
of subpoena) questions of domination or interference by employers, and Issue(subject to judicial review) cease and desist orders--which are subject to judicial
review. The constitutional theory of the Act is that labor disputes affect interstate
commerce prejudicially.
116During the week of April 12, 1936, there was testimony before the sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor which is investigatingindustrial espionage that the income from that source of three private detective
agencies has probably amounted to $60,000,000 a year. Now Republic, Apr. 22,
1936, at 303. LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW 228-9 n, has an extensive bibliography
of this subject, and the use of armed guards and military force in strikes; see also
LEVINSON, I BREAK STRIKEs-THE TECNXQUE OF PAUL L. BEaop (1935); WITTE,THE GOVERNaM=T IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932) 198-201; Use of Military Force in
Domestic Disturbances (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 879.11 7
"There is nothing," he said, "that I more deprecate than the use of theFourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making" of such experiments. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 139 (1921). This sentence was qualified by "in the insulated chambers afforded
by the several States." The question, however, was of state legislation. Holmes
was not unaware of the inadequacy of state boundaries to insulate Michigan from
New York printing press factories.1 18
"Probableism" was his name for his own philosophy.
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subsist". 1 9 He saw that other policies would inevitably be tried
as conditions became intolerable to increasing numbers. And some-
thing better might be stumbled on.
We hold no brief for any policy, any statute. We have advo-
cated nothing. Our aim has been to show some main things of
a scene of legal history in which a great man held the stage, sur-
rounded by incoherence. We do not maintain that Holmes was right.
It may be that no one is, or ever has been. As Holmes knew better
than most, there is no science by which the rightness of any best
guess of social policy can be tested. That may be the most useful
lesson of the scene in which he was hero. Without better social
understanding than anyone has ever had, and power informed by it
as well by sympathy and prudence, the chance seems slight for any-
thing worth calling "solution" of labor and other problems.
1 19 HoBBES, L m=Ax (1649) Part I, c. xiii.
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